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can be bound. What is needed is to bind those who are abroad.
Under these circumstances the true spirit of international comity
requires that schemes of this character, legalized at home, should
be recognised in other countries. The fact that the bonds made in
Canada were payable in New York is unimportant, except in de-
termining by what law the parties intended their contract should
be governed, and every citizen of a country, other than that in
which the corporation is located, may protect himself against all
unjust legislation of the foreign government by refusing to deal
with its corporations.
On the whole we are satisfied that the scheme of arrangement
bound the defendants in error, and that these actions cannot be
maintained. The same result was reached by the Court of Queen's
Bench in the Province of Ontario when passing on a similar stat-
ute in Jones v. The Canada Central Railway Co., supra.
The judgments are reversed and the causes remanded, with in-
structions to enter judgment on the facts found in favor of the
railway company in each of the cases.
Mr. Justice FIELD, not being present at the argument of this
case, took no part in the decision.
Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered a dissenting opinion.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ENGLISH COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY.
1
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
2
SUPREME COURT OF MAINE.s
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
4
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
5
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
6
AGENT. See Former Recovery.
ARBITRATION.
Award-Not Conclusive as to Claims not Considered.-On a submis-
I Selected from late numbers of the Law Reports.
2 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions filed
during Oct. Term 1883. The cases will probably appear in 18 or 19 Otto Reports.
3 From J. W. Spaulding, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 75 Me. Reports.
4 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 60 Ad. Reports.
5 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 134 Mfass. Reports.
6 From BE. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 39 or
40 Ohio State Reports.
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sion of 1all demands between the parties" thereto, the award is no bar
to a claim not in fact submitted or considered by the arbitrators : Inh.
of W. Desert v. Inh. of Tremont, 75 Me.
ATTACHMENT.
Payment before Attachment- Sending of Checks.-The alleged
trustees on a December afternoon directed their book-keeper to send the
defendant a check for an amount due him. The check was thereupon
made. At eight o'clock in the evening the writ was served upon the
trustees. They notified the book-keeper the next morning, and were
informed by him that he had mailed the cheek by the mail which closed
at fifteen minutes past seven that morning, having no knowledge of the
trustee process. The check was duly presented and paid: Eeld, that
the trustees were not chargeable for the amount thus paid: Jordan v.
Jordan, 75 3e.
BAILMENT.
Livery-stable Keeper- Contract- Vcious Horse-Implied Warranty.
-A livery-stable keeper who lets a horse for hire for a trip, impliedly
promises that the horse is a kind and suitable one for the purpose for
which he is let, and not vicious, nor in the habit of kicking :- Windle v.
Jordan, 75 Me.
BANK. See Corporation.
BILLs AND NOTES.
Sale of-Implied Waranty-Solvenc.-Where one sells negotiable
busifiess paper in good faith without endorsing it, making no misrepre-
sentations respecting it, and at a rate of discount indicating that the
purchaser has a compensation for his risk, there is no implied warranty
on the part of the seller as to the past, present or future solvency of the
makers or indorsers : .Milliken v. ( lopman, 75 Me.
In cases of sale or barter of commercial paper, as of other personal
property, the rule of caveat emytor applies : Id.
Indorsement as Co-sreties-Liability of Indorsers to equal Contri-
bution inter se.-The liabilities inter se of successive indorsers of a bill
or note must, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, be deter-
mined according to the ordinary principles of the law-merchant, whereby
a prior indorser must indemnify a subsequent one: Macdonald v. Whit-
feld, 8 Appeal Cases 733.
But the whole circumstances attendant upon the making, issue and
transference of a bill or note may be legitimately referred to for the
purpose of ascertaining the true relation to each other of the parties
who put their signatures upon it, either as makers or indorsers; and
reasonable inferences derived from these facts and circumstances, are
admitted to the effect of qualifying, altering or even inverting the
relative liabilities which the law-merchant would otherwise assign to
them : Id.
Where the directors of a company mutually agreed with each other
to become sureties to the bank for the same debts of the company, and
in pursuance of that agreement successively indorsed three promissory
notes of the company: Reid, reversing the judgment of the court
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below, that they were entitled and liable to equal contribution inter se,
and were not liable to indemnify each other successively according to
the priority of their indorsements : Id.
Reynolds v. Wheeler, 10 0. B. (N. S.) 561, approved; Steele v.
McKinley, 5 App. Cas. 754, &istinguished : Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
Railroad-Extra Charge for Fare Paid on Train-Expulsion.-A
railroad company may charge a higher price for carrying passengers
when the fare is paid on the train, than it does at its ticket offices, pro-
vided the price thus charged is reasonable, and the fare charged on the
train does not exceed the maximum allowed by law: Cn., San. & Cl.
Railroad v. Skillman, 39 or 40 Ohio St.
A person entering the cars, without having purchased a ticket, and
persistently refusing to pay the usual and reasonable fare, upon demand
by the conductor, and after reasonable 'time in which to determine
whether he will or will not pay the same, may lawfully be removed
from the train : Id.
The expulsion of such person may be at a place other than a railrQad
depot, or usual stopping place, provided care ig taken not to expose him
to serious injury .or danger: Id.
Such person acquires no right to remain on the train, by offering to
pay the usual fare after the train has been. stopped for the purpose of
ejecting him : Id
CONFLICT OP LAWS. See Constitutional Law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Law Impairing the Obligation of Contracts.-In determining the
question whether the Supreme Court of a state has given effect to a law
of the state which impairs the obligation of a contract, the Supreme
Court of the United States will decide for itself, independently of the
decisions of the state court, whether there is a contract, and whether
its obligation is impaired; and if the decision of the question as to the
existence of the alleged contract requires a construction of state con-
stitutions and laws, it is not necessarily governed by previous decisions
of the state court, except where they have been so firmly established as
to constitute a rule of property. This is true even where the state
courts have construed the statute as creating a contract: Louisville and
N Railroad Co. v. Palmes, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
CONTEMPT.
Attachment-Priilege from Arrest.-Disobedience by a solicitor to
an order of court made against him as an officer of the court, is a con-
tempt of a criminal nature, and an attachment granted to enforce com-
pliance with the order of court is process of a punitive and disciplinary
character; and therefore no privilege from arrest exists or can be
claimed against the execution of the attachment: In, re Freston, 11
Q. B. Div.
CONTRACT.
Approval of Agent-Fraudulent Rejection-E-xercise of Judgment.-
Under a contract between L. and a railroad company, L. agreed to fur-
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nish the company a certain quantity of ice, of a given description, the
same to be subject to the inspection and approval of an agent of the
company. In an action by L. against the company to recover damages
for a breach of the contract, it was held, 1st. That if the agent rejected
the ice fraudulently, or in bad faith, the defendant was responsible for
his act. 2d. But that under the contract, which was perfectly lawful,
the judgment of the agent, no matter how erroneous or mistaken it
might be, or how unreasonable it might appear to others, was conclusive
between the parties, unless tainted with fraud or bad faith : Lynn v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 60 Md.
Considration-Nudum pactum.-F. sued L. and J., and set out in
the narr. as his cause of action, that the father of the defendants in his
lifetime was indebted to the plaintiff for money lent on his promissory
note for $500, and that after his death the defendants agreed that if the
plaintiff would deliver up to them the said promissory note, then due
and unpaid, they would pay him $500; in consideration of which pro-
mise the said plaintiff did deliver up to said defendants the said note of
their father; but the defendants did not pay the said sum of $500. The
plaintiff stated in evidenpe, as the reason of the transfer of the note of
the father to the defendants, and the giving of theirs, that the defend-
ants said if he would give them no trouble they would be responsible
for the money. The deceased left no estate out of which the note
could have been paid; and it did not appear that at the time the plain-
tiff relinquished the note, any administrator of the personal estate of
the deceased had been appointed: Held, that there was no legal con-
sideration upon which the defendants could be held liable to pay the
plaintiff's demand, their undertaking being nudumpactum: Schroeder
v. Fink, 60 Md.
CORPORATION. See Neglitgence.
Pledgee of Stock-Not liable as Stockholder.-A. being indebted to a
bank, pledged to it as collateral security for such debt certain shares of
stock in the Salem Manufacturing Company, and executed to the presi-
dent of the bank a power of attorney to transfer the stock, on the
books of the company, to the pledgee, or any other person to whom the
same may be sold. The stock was never transferred on the books of
the company to the bank; it never voted upon it or exercised acts
of ownership thereof: Held, the bank was not a stockholder and was
not liable to creditors of the corporation in an action to enforce the
individual liability of stockholders: Henke v. Salem Manufacturing
Co., 39 or 40 Ohio St.
COVENANT.
Building Estate-Alutual Restriction Covenants-Alteration of Char-
acter of* Property - Breach of Covenant - Injunction. - A building
estate was laid out in lots, which were sold by the owners of the estate
to different purchasers, each of whom covenanted with the vendors, and
with the owners of the other lots entitled to the benefit of the cove-
nant, not to build a shop on his land, or to use his house as a shop. or to
carry on any trade therein. The purchaser of one of the lots, who occu-
pied his house as a private residence, brought an action against the pur-
chaser of another lot, who was using his house as a beer-shop with an
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"' off" license, to restrain him from breaking his covenant, and for
damages. The defendant had, to the knowledge of the plaintiff, so
used his house for three years before the action was commenced There
was evidence that several other houses built on others of the lots (one
of them immediately opposite the plaintiff's house), had been for some-
time used as shops, notwithstanding the covenant, and that many of the
houses adjoinihg the plaintiff's house were occupied, not each by a
single tenant, but each by two families at weekly rents : Held, that the
character of the property had become so changed that the original pur-
pose-the keeping the estate as a residential property-for which the
covenant had been entered into had failed, and that it would under the
circumstances be iiequitable to enforce the specific performance of the
covenant: Sayers v. Collyer, 24 Oh. Div.
The principle of Duke of Bedford v. !.ustees of the British Museum,
3 'My. & K. 552, applied. Id.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Jury.
Homicide-Self Defence.-Where one is assaulted in his home, or
the home itself is attacked, he may use such means as are necessary to
repel the assailant from the house or to prevent his forcible entry, or
material injury to his home, even to the taking of life. But a homi-
cide in such a case would not be justifiable unless the slayer, in the
careful and proper use of his faculties, bonafide believes, and has reason-
able ground to believe, that the killing is necessary to repel the assailant
or prevent his forcible entry: State v. Peacock, 39 or 40 Ohio St.
DAMAGES.
Exemplary- When allowed.-Punitive or" exemplary damages are
only allowed because of the malicious motive which is supposed, from
the circumstances attending the wrong, to have animated the wrong-
doer and prompted it. If the cause of offence were discontinued with
such reasonable promptness as the circumstances of the case allowed,
exemplary damages should not be awarded: Oursler v. Balto. & Ohio
Railroad Co., 60 Mld.
DiVORCE.
Bigamy of Petitioner under belief of Wife's Death.-A husband
believing that his wife was dead married again, and subsequently dis-
covered that his wife was alive and had committed adultery: Held, that
notwithstanding the bigamy, he was entitled to a dissolution of his
marriage : Freegard v. Freegard, 8 Prob. Div.
EQUITY.
Injunction-Light and Air-Adjoining Owner-Railroad.-The
plaintiff was owner of a house, some of the windows of which over-
looked a piece of land belonging to a railway company and used as a
goods yard of a station. When the house had been built sixteen years
the company put up a screen opposite the plaintiff's windows to pre-
vent his acquiring an easement of light and air. The plaintiff brought
an action for injunction to restrain the company from interfering with
his light and air; and moved for an interlocutory injunction till the
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hearing: Held (reversing the decision of BACON, V. C.), that the plain.
tiff had no equity to restrain the company from taking measures to pre-
vent prescriptive rights from being acquired for windows looking upon
their land. The injunction was therefore refhsed : Norton v. London
aud Northwestern iRailway Company, 9 Oh. D. 623, and Swindon
Waterworks Company v. Wilts and Berks Canal Navigation Company,
Law Rep., 7 H. L. 697, considered: Bonner v. Great Western Railway
Company, 24 Ch. Div. 1.
EVIDENOE. See Slander.
Variance between Note and MJfortgage-Parol Evidence to Explain-
Interest.-If *a promissory note and a mortgage given to secure it, exe-
cuted at the same time, do not correspond as to interest, extrinsic evi-
dence is admissible in an action at law to show which paper expresses
the real intention and agreement of the parties: Payson v. Lamson,
134 Mass.
EXECUTOR.
Commssions.-A testator cannot by any thing put in his will, in any
wise affect the comiissions which the law allows his executor; and
whete there has been a full administration, even the court has no power
to deprive him of the minimum amount which the law gives him:
Bandy v. Collins, 60 Md.
FixTums.
Contract to Purchase-Betterments.-Buildings erected on the land
of another by one occupying under a contract to purchase become the
property of the owner of the soil if the purchase be not completed,
and are not betterments ; Tyler v. Fickett, 75 Me.
Tenant-Removal after end of Term-Replevin.-A tenant at will of
a lessee of land erected a small building on the land resting on stone
posts sunk into the ground. The building was erected with the knowl-
edge and consent of the lessor of the land, and with an understanding
on his part, and on that of the tenant at will, that it could be removed
as a trade fixture. Both tenancies expired at the same time, and nei-
ther tenant removed the-building; the lessor resumed possession of the
land, and soon after the former tenant at will hired it with other land
at an increased rent: Held, that the tenant at will could not, after this,
remove the building, or maintain replevin for it, on the refusal of the
owner of the land to allow its removal: Aclzer v. Estabrook, 134
Mass.
FORMER RECOVERY.
Recovery against Agent-Subseguent Suit against Principal.-A
judgment against an agent for a fraud committed while acting within
the scope of his agency, on which no collection or payment has been
made, is no bar to an action against the principal for the same fraud:
Mdple v. C., BI. & D. Railroad, 39 or 40 Ohio St.
In such a case the fact that the principal was wholly ignorant of the
fraud, is immaterial: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Recent Legislation-Effect on Doctrine that .rfusband.and Wife are
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one Person.-Having regard to the Married Women's Property Act
of 1882, the old rule of law that husband and wife were for most pur-
poses one pers6n, so that under a gift by will to a husband and wife and
a third person the husband and wife took only one moiety between them,
the third person taking the other moiety, is no longer applicable to
such a gift under a will that has come into operation since the coin-
mencement of that act: In re March, 24 Oh. Div. 222.
INFANT.
Ratification of Contract-Ignorance of Previons Ifivalidity.-Where
a person of full age promises to perform a contract entered into during
his minority, he thereby ratifies the contract, although he does not
know at the time of the promise, that by reason of his minority at the
time of the contract, he is not legally liable thereon: Andersbn v.
Loward, 39 or 40 Ohio St.
INJUNCTION. See Equity.
Collection of Taxes.-The collection of taxes under the internal rev.
enue laws, by United States officers who claim the same to have been
properly assessed, will not be enjoined: Snyder v. Marks, S. 0. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1883.
INSURANCE.
Fre Policy-Innocent Concealment of Prior Insurance-Forfeiture-
IWarrant.-The fact that, at the time of making a contract of insur-
ance, by an agent, of the insured with an agent of an insurance con-
pany, a prior insurance by the same company existed on the same
property, which was a material fact, and which was not known to either
contracting party, will not avoid the contract, although the, contract
would not have been made if the existence of such prior insurance had
been known at the time : Bridgewater Iron Co. v. .Enterprise Ins. Co.,
134 Mass.
If, at the time of making verbal application for insurance, the appli-
-cant produces a list of the existing insurance on the property sought to
be insured, and states his honest belief that it is correct, and the insur-
ance company has the means of verifying the statement, but fails to do
so, and the list proves to be incorrect, this is not a misrepresentation of
fact which will avoid a policy subsequently issued, containing an express
warranty that all the facts and circumstances have been truly stated in
the application, and a condition that, "if any material fact or circum-
stance shall not have been fairly represented," the policy shall be null
and voicl: Id.
Suicide.-In order that d self-killing shall be a death "by suicide" or
"by his own hand," within the meaning of those words as used in an
insurance policy, the deceased must have understood the moral character
of the act he was about to commit as well as its physical consequences:
anhattan Life ins. Co. v. Broughton, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
INTEREST. See Evidence.
JUROR.
Polling of Jury.-Where the jury is polled in a murder ciase, it is
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the duty of each juror to say for himself whether he finds the prisoner
guilty of murder in the first, or second degree: Williams v. The State,
60 Md.
Where the response of each juror in such case is simply "guilty,"
without a designation of the degree of guilt, such verdict is a nullity.
And the fact that the clerk, immediately after polling the jury, called
upon them to hearken to the verdict as the court has recorded it-
" your foreman saith that J. W., the prisoner at the bar, is guilty of
murder in the first degree, and so say you all "-does not affect the
question: Id.
Non-age of a Juror-After Verdict rendered.-After verdict rendered,
it is too late to object that a juror was not of proper age, although the
party was not aware of the fact prior to the verdict: Johns v. Hodges,
60 Md.
Discretion of Judge.-A judge may in his discretion exclude from
the panel a juror who is not legally disqualified to sit; exceptions do
not lie to the act. He may put a legal juror off, but cannot allow an
illegal juror to go on: Snow v. Weeks, 75 Me.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See Fixtures.
LEASE. -See Vendor and Vendee
LEGACY.
Charge on Land.-If one of several executors of a will, who are
also residuary devisces and legatees, is a devisee of a parcel of land on
the condition of his paying a certain legacy, and accepts the devise, the
giving of a bond by all the executors, conditioned to py debts and
legacies, will not vest in him an absolute title to the land so devised,
which he can convey to a bona fide purchaser free of the lien for the
legacy; and such purchaser cannot maintain a bill in equity to compel
the legatee to seek payment of the legacy from' the residuary estate, or
from the sureties on the bond, before proceeding against the land:
Trustees, &c., v. Smith, 134 Mass.,
LUNATIC. See Negligence.
MASTER AND SERVANT. °
Negligence-Risks of Employment.-W., employed as a repairman
by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, while proceeding down the
track on a hand car, on a very foggy morning, to surface up the track,
was run into by an extra train coming in an opposite direction, at a
rapid speed, and without any previous warning, and was permanently
injured by the collision. It was the practice of the company, of whioh
W. had knowledge, to run extra ttains without previous notice. In an
action against the railroad company by W. to recover damages for the
injuries he had sustained, it was held: 1st. That when W. entered the
service of the defendant 's a repairman on its road, he took upon him-
self the natural and ordinary risks belonging to such service. 2d.
That if with the knowledge that the defendant in the management of
its road was in the habit of running extra trains without notice, and
tnat it was his duty as one of the repairmen to be always on the look-
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out for danger from that source, he continued to remain in the defend-
ant's service, he must be considered as having assumed the risk to
which he was thereby exposed, and having been injured in consequence
thereof, he could not recover damages of the defendant: Pennsylvania
Railroad Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md.
MECHANICS' LIEN.
Materials furnished to Vendee under Verbal Contract.-A. made a
verbal contract to purchase a lot of land of B., took possession of it,
erected a building upon it, and failed to pay for the labor and materials
which entered into the construction of the building. One lien-creditor
attached the building as personal property, and another attached the
building with the lot of land as real estate. Held, that the building
became a part of the real estate of B., and that as against him neither
creditor obtained a valid attachmenv upon the building: .Dustin v.
Crosby, 75 Me.
MORTGAGE.
Form of.-No precise form of words is necessary to constitute a mort-
gage, but there must be a present purpose of the mortgagor to pledge
his land for the payment of a sum of money, or the performance of some
other act : New Orleans Nat. Banking Association v. Adams, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1883.
I1UNICIPAL CORPORATION
Negligence-Defective Footpath.-If between the sidewalk of a street
in a city and that portion of the street wrought for a carriage-way there
is a grassed space, over which a footpath has been worn by use of per-
sons having occasion to enter another street abutting on this street, but
not crossing it, or to come in the opposite direction, the city is liable to
a person injured by a defect in such path, if the path was known to and
recognised by the city as a part of the wrought line of travel, in the
absence of any path or other provision made by the city for crossing
the street at or near the locality in question, or of any barrier or other
warning to indicate that the path as actually used was unsafe or unsuit-
able: Aston v. City of Newton, 134 Mass.
NEGLIGENCE. 'See .funicipal Corporation.
CorToration-Independent Contractor.-A corporation organized for
the purpose of constructing and operating a railroad, having acquired
its right of way by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, or
otherwise, may contract with another person for the construction of the
whole or any part ofthe road, without retaining the right to control the
mode or manner of doing the work; and in such case the corporation is
not liable to third persons for an injury resulting from the carelessness
or wilful act of the contractor: .ughes v. an. and Sp. Railroad Co.,
39 or 40 Ohio St.
A right reserved in the contract, on the part of the railroad company,
to direct as to the quantity of work to be done, or the condition of the
work when completed, is not a right to control the mode or manner of
doing the work, within the rule above stated : Id.
The rule of non-liability on the part of the employer for the wrong
VoL. XXII.-10
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of the contractor, applies to contracts in re'spect to real estate as well as
movable property, except that owners of real estate cannot relieve them-
selves for liability, through the intervention of a contractor, for the
erection of a nuisance ; nor for an injury to third persons, necessarily or
naturally resulting from doing the work in the manner it was contracted
to be done: Id.
I
Breach of Duty-Defective Artide supplied for Use-Liabiity of
Person suplying a Defective Article causing Injury to th Person who
used it.-The defendant, a dock owner, supplied and put up a staging
outside a ship in his dock under a contract with the shipowner. The
plaintiff was a workman in the employ of a ship painter who had con-
tracted with the shipowner to paint the outside of the ship, and in order
to do the painting the plaintiff went on and used the staging, when one
of the ropes by which it was slung, being unfit for. use when supplied by
the defendant, broke, and by reason thereof the plaintiff fell into the
dock and was injured. Held, reversing the decision of the Queen's
Bench Division, that the plaintiff, being engaged on work on the vessel
in the performance of which the defendant, as dock owner, was inter-
ested, the defendant was under an obligation to him to take reasonable
care that at the time he supplied the staging and ropes they were in a
fit state to be used, and that for the neglect of such duty the defendant
was liable to the plaintiff for the injury he had sustained. Hld, also,
by BRETT, M. R., that whenever one person is by circumstances placed
in such a position with 'regard to another, that every one of ordinary
sense who did think would at once recognise' that if he did not use ordi-
nary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances
he would cause danger or injury to the person or property of -the other,
a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoidsuch danger: Aaten
v. Pender, 11 Q. B. Div. 503.
Physician's Certificate of Insanity-0cmmitments to Insane Asylum
-Evdence.-In an action against physicians, for falsely certifying,
through malice or negligence, to the insanity of a person, who is thereby
committed to the insane asylum, and the pleadings raise the issue as
to the sanity of such person at the time when the certificate alleges her
to be insane, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff in respect to the
averment and claim that she was then sane: Pei ell v. Cumminsa, 75
Me.
In such an action the falsehood, and not the insufficiency of the cer-
tificate, is the ground of action against the certifying physicians. With-
out statutory provisions to that effect there cannot be a civil action for
damages against a physician, based upon the insufficiency of the meth-
ods which he pursued in reaching and certifying a correct conclusion:
Id.
If physicians who have certified to the insanity of a person, have not
made the inquiry and examination which the statute requires, or if their
evidence and certificate in any respect of form or substance is not suffi-
cient to justify a commitment, the municipal officers should not commit,
and if they do it is their.fault and not that of the physicians, provided
they have stated facts and oiPinions truly and have acted with due pro.
fessional skill and care: Id.
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PARENT AND OHILD.
Right of Afother .to recover for Loss of Child's Service.-A mother
sued the county commissioners of Hartford county to recover for injury
done to her minor son, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of
the defendants in not keeping a public road in repair, over which the
son was riding at the time he was injured. The father had died before
the injury occurred. Held, 1st. That the mother, the father being dead,
was entitled to recover for the services of her minor son, provided he
was at the time of the injury, actually living with and supported by her.
2d. That if the son were thus living with and supported by his mother,
she was clearly entitled to recover for the care and labor of nursing him,
and the expense and cost of medicines and medical attendance to which
she was subjected on account of his injury, and which she procured for
him. 3. That the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the pain and
suffering of her son, nor for her own anxiety and suffering on his
account: County Commissioners v. Hamilton, 60 Md.
PARTNERSHIP.
Real Estate in Name of one Partner-.mprovements thereon-Pre-
sumption.-Improvements of a permanent nature, erected upon real
estate owned by one member of a partnership who holds the legal title
thereto, will, notwithstanding the real estate is used as the place of bus-
iness of the firm, be presumed to be the individual property of such
partner until it is proven that such improvements were erected by the
firm and paid for out of firm assets, or contributed as firm capital by such
partner: Goepper v Kinsinger, 39 or 40 Ohio St.
In the absence of proof of such joint ownership by the firm, or rep-
resentations or conduct of the individual partner as will mislead cred-
itors and, as to them, estop him from denying the ownership of the firm,
the right of the creditor to subject such property to the payment of
partnership debts, in preference to the individual debts of such part-
ners, must depend upon the right of the partners as between themselves:
Id.
In a case therefore where all the facts proved are consistent with the
ownership of such partner, and that the use alone of the property was
contributed to the firm, during its existence as such, that view should
be adopted, rather than one that will subject such property to partfter-
ship liabilities to the exclusion of individual creditors: Id.
PATENT.
Construction of License.-An individual was licensed for five years to
use a certain patented article in a certain manufacture, in a certain ter-
ritory, and obligated himself to use the same according to the directions of
the licensor, and to use all his business tact and skill, &c., to extend the
sale of the product in the manufacture of which the patent was to be
used: he further agreed in such license to accept the rights covered by
certain patents and to maintain them at his own cost and expense in
suits at law ; the license was revokable upon failure of the licensee to
perform his covenants. Held, that in the absence of express words to
show an intent to extend the right to an executor, administrator or as-
signee, the license terminated upon the death of the licensee within the
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five years. Oliver v. Morgan, 10 Heisk. 322, departed from; Oliver v.
Rumford ChemicalWorks, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
PROHIBITION.
Cannot be used as a Substitute for an Appeal- When Judgment of
United States Court may be reviewed.-It appearing upon an application
for a writ of prohibition that the evident purpose thereof was to correct
a supposed error in a judgment of an admiralty court on the merits of
an action. Reid, that the remedy, if any, was by appeal; and that if
an appeal would not lie the parties were concluded by what had been
done: Ex parte State of Pennsylvania, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
Congress alone has the power to determine whether the judgment of
a court of the United States, of competent jurisdiction shall be re-
viewed or not: ld.
RAILROAD. See Common Carrier.
Consolidation of two Roads.-When two companies are authorized to
consolidate their roads, it is to be presumed that the franchises and pri-
vileges of each continue to exist in respect to the several roads so con-
solidated : County of Green v. Conners, S. C. U. S.. Oct. Term.1883.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
-nterpleader Bill.-A bill of interpleader, brought by a citizen of
another state against two citizens of this state, cannot be removed on
the petition of one of the defendants, to the Circuit Court of the United
States, under the U. S. Stat. of March 3d 1875, § 2: Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Alen, 134 Mass.
REPLEvI. See Filtures,
SALE.
Bill of Sale- Wien Delvemy of Goods unnecessary.--An adminis-
trator, upon proof of the execution of a formal bill of sale of personal
property to his intestate, acknowledging receipt of the consideration
therein named, and proof of a subsequent sale of the same property by
the grantor, is prima facie entitled, in an action for conversion against
the latter, to recover the value of the property at the time of the sub-
sequent sale: Pilrook v. Eaton, 184 Mass.
No delivery of the personal property named in a formal bill of sale is
necessary to pass the title, as between the parties : .d.
SLANDER.
Accusation of (rme-Amount of Proof necessary as to !ruth of Ac-
cusation.-In an action of slander for words which imputed to the plain-
tiff the crime of stealing a horse, the defendant, as a defence, pleaded
the truth of the alleged defamatory words. Held, that to maintain this
defence, it was not necessary that it be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt: Bell v. Ic Ginness, 39 or 40 Ohio St.
SUNDAY.
Last Day-Tender on following Day.-If the last day of the three
years limited by statute for the redemption of land from a mortgage,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
falls on Sunday, a tender of the amount due on the mortgav hu ,a he
following day is too late: Haley v. Young, 134 Mass.
SURETY. See Bills and Notes.
Etension of Time-New Promise-Burden of Proof.-If, after rime
has been given to the principal by the creditor, the surety, with full
knowledge of all the facts, promises to pay the note if the principal aoes
not, he is liable without any new consideration for the promise: Bram-
ble v. Ward, 39 or 40 Ohio St.
When the answer of a surety sets up that an extension of time was
given to the principal, without the knowledge or consent of the surety,
he must make this appear by a preponderance of the evidence: Id.
Bond of Agent- Concealment of Previous Default.-S. had knowl-
edge that his agent, by culpable carelessness, had lost money collected
by him in the discharge of his duties, nd for that reason required that
he should either give a bond to pay over all moneys hereafter received
or collected by him, or quit his employment. S. did not inform the
sureties of his agent's former culpable carelessness and they had no
knowledge thereof. Held, that the principal could not avail himself of
the guaranty thus obtained: Smith v. Joselyn, 9 or 40 Ohio St.
Co-Sureties in Severalty-Release-Pleading.-W here two or more
sureties contract severally the creditor does not break the contract with
one of them by releasing the other. The contract remaining entire, the
surety in order to escape liability must show an existing right to contri-
bution from his co-surety which has been taken away or injuriously
affected by his release. Jield, in an action upon a guarantee, that a
plea to the effect that M. was the defendant's co-surety, and had been
released in consideration of a new guarantee given to the plaintiff, con-
stituted no defence; the plea nowhere averring or implying that the
liability was joint, or that the defendant became surety on the faith of
AI.'s co-suretyship, or that any right of contribution had arisen against
M. which had been taken away or injuriously affected, or that the de-
fendant bad suffered any damage or injury by the substitution described:
Ward v. National Bank of New Zealand, 8 App. Cas. 755.
TAX AND TAXATION. See Injunction.
TImE. See Sunday.
TROVER.
Refusal to allow Employees to Rent a House--Loss of Rent-Malice.
-Trover is not maintainable by the owner of a house against one,
though owner of the land, who refuses to employ any tenant who may
occupy the same: Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me.
An employer has a right to refuse to employ or to retain in his service
any person renting certain specified premises, and the owner of such
premises has no cause of action against him for the exercise of such
right, though such refusal was through malice or ill will to such owner:
TRUST.
Precatory Trust-Absolute Estate.-A testator gave to his wife all his
real and personal estate "to her sole use, benefit and disposal ;" and pro-
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vided that " whatever may be left of my estate, if any. she may by will
or otherwise give to those of my heirs that she may think best, she
knowing my mind upon that subject. I am willing to leave the matter
entirely with her, feeling satisfied that she will do as I have requested
her to in the matter." Reld, that the wife took all the estate which
the testator could devise, with the absolute right of disposing of it as
she saw fit: Davis v. Mailey, 134 Mass.
Precatory Trust.-A testator gave and devised all his real and per-
sonal estate unto and to the absolute use of his wife, her heirs, exec-
utors, administrators and assigns, "in full confidence that she will do
what is right as to the disposal thereof, between my children, either in
her lifetime or by will after her decease." Held, that under these words
the widow took an absolute interest in the property unfettered by any
trust in favor of the children: In re Adams and Kensington Vestry, 24
Ch. Div. 199.
Lambe v. Eames, L. R., 6 Ch. 597; In re Hutchinson and Tenant, 8
Ch. Div. 540 ; Curnick v. Tucker, L. R., 17 Eq. 320; and Le Marchant
v. Le l~archant, L. R., 18 Eq. 414, commented on: .Id.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See Removal of Causes.
Jurisdiction-Suit by Assignee-ollusion.-F. died in August of
1876, in New York, of which state he was a citizen; and presently
afterwards, his widow and family removed to New Jersey. In February
of 1877, the widow assigned an insurance policy on the life of her hus-
band which was payable to her, to N., of New York, in trust; to pay a
claim of $2000, and the necessary expenses of collection, and to invest
the surplus for her benefit. In a suit on the policy brought by thd
widow in 1876, the Court of Common Pleas of New York city, in 1878,
granted a nonsuit because the evidence showed that the death was
caused by suicide, within the meaning of the policy according to the law
of the state of New York. In 1879, in a suit brought by N. against
the widow to be relieved of his trust, B., a citizen of New Jersey, was
on her request substituted as trustee. There was evidence tending to
show that one object in having B. appointed was to bring a suit in the
United States Court. In a suit by B. in the United States Court, Held,
that it had jurisdiction, and that the case was not -within the 1st or 5th
sections of the Act of March 3d 1875"; and that the question involved
was one of general jurisprudence, upon which the widow and her trus-
tee had a right to seek the independent judgment of a federal court:
Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
1 VENDOR AND VENDEE. See Rxetures.
Lease- Option to Purchase Fee Simple--Nature of Interest conferred
on Lessee-Real and Personal Representatives.-A lease of land con-
tained a covenant by the lessor with the lessee, his executors, adminis-
trators and assigns, that if the lessee, his executors, administrators or
assigns should at any time thereafter be desirous of purchasing the fee
simple of the demised land, and should give notice in writing to the les-
sor, his heirs and assigns, then the lessor, his heirs or assigns would
accept 12001. for the purchase of the fee simple, and on receipt thereof
would convey The fee simple to the lessee, his heirs or assigns, or as he
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or they should direct. The lessee died intestate, and nearly twenty
years after his death, his heir, who was also administrator of his per-
sonal estate, called on the devisee of the lessor to convey the fee simple
to him in accordance with the covenant, and a conveyance was executed
accordingly. The heir afterwards contracted to sell part of the property
thus conveyed to him. Held, that the option to purchase was attached
to the lease and passed with it; that it consequently passed as part of
the lessee's personal estate to the administrator, aid that the adminis-
trator could not make a good title to the purchaser, unless the next-of-
kin of the lessee would concur in the sale: In re Adams and the Ken-
sington Vestry, 24 Ch. Div. 199.
Vendor's Lien- Trust created-Impairment of the Secarity of the
Cestuis que Trust.-G. and wife, in consideration of the conveyance to
them by B. and wife of certain real estate, agreed in writing, under
seal, to support said B. and wife and their daughter A., during their sev-
eral lives, and to pay all their doctor's bills and other expenses, and to
pay B. $25 for four years, and also to pay certain debts of B., and at
certain periods to pay certain designated sums of money to other per-
sons named; which several sums of money, together with the estimated
value of the board and clothing of the persons to be provided for, were
computed to amount to $5000. The same sum was named as the con-
sideration in the conveyance from B. and wife to G. and wife. The lat-
ter took possession of the property, and proceeded to discharge the duties
undertaken by the agreement. On a bill filed by B. and wife charging
the non-payment of the consideration money, and praying a sale of the
land for the payment thereof, it was Held, 1st. That complainants were
not entitled to- a decree for a sale of the land. 2d. That having ac-
cepted the deed from B. and wife under the written agreement, a trust
was created, and G. and wife were bound in equity faithfully to perform
the duties assumed by them, and the land was properly chargeable with
the trust. 3d. That G. and wife should not be permitted to impair the
security of the cestuis gue trust, for the fulfilment of the several trusts,
by the creation of liens beyond such as the court may adjudge to be
authorized by the title given and the objects to be attained: Benscotter
v. Green, 60 Md.
WARRANTY. See Bills and Notes.
WILL. See Legacy ; Trust.
What is-Parol Evidence.-The following paper was propounded as
a will: "Baltimore, July 20th 1882. In anticipation of my departure
from the city of Baltimore, and to provide for possible contingencies, I
hereby give, bargain and sell and transfer unto my daughter, Ann C.
Kelleher, her personal representatives and assigns, all my machinery,
horses, wagons, goods, chattels and effects, which I now have, or may
hereafter acquire, or possess, and all moneys, claims and demands to
which I am, or may be hereafter, entitled, reserving to myself the use
of the same, and the right to dispose of the same otherwise, if I deem
proper. Witness my hand and seal this 20th day of July 1882.
his
OWEN + KERNAN, [SEAL.]
mark
Witness :-James MeColgan."
